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mediaval common law was that civil liability was based upon an act
causing damage, if that act fell within one of the causes of action
provided for by the law, and this idea excluded any direct reference
to negligence as a cause of liability.13 Damage to the person was
remedied by trespass, which would only lie in the presence of a direct
act of violence to the individual harmed. But, since damage may
result to the person through the doing of an act lawful in itself, but
because of surrounding circumstances an act of violence to the injured
party, it was necessary to develop a new form of action, which was
known as trespass on the case.'4 Thus it may be seen that the plain-
tiff in the early conception of negligence did not sue to recover for
the doing of a "wrong" as such, but rather that his right to bring an
action was the culmination of the development of the idea that he
had been personally wronged, although not by an act directed against
him personally, and so should be afforded a remedy.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates that negligence
will not be considered as a tort unless it results in the commission of
a wrong, which in turn imports the violation of a right owing to the
individual seeking redress.
J.W. B.
CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION.-It is ancient learn-
ing that mutual promises give rise to a contract. So long and well
settled is this proposition that the thought rarely arises to-day that
such was not always the law.' However, from that doctrine, there has
devolved the rule finding expression in the statement that there must
be mutuality of obligation to render a contract binding on the parties
thereto. Williston, in criticism thereof, says that "this form of state-
ment is likely to cause confusion, and however limited, is at best an
unnecessary way of stating that there must be a valid consideration." 2
The criticism of the learned author is merited.
Primarily, where contract liability is sought to be imposed, the
quest is directed to ascertaining whether there is a valid consideration
supporting the obligation intended to be enforced. The rule embod-
ied in the statement that there must be mutuality, as though that were
a requisite in the formation of contracts, is ofttimes an insecure
guidepost confounding the seeker. For mutuality of obligation is
never found in unilateral contracts; and the equitable as distinguished
from the legal tenet tends towards greater confusion, for lack of
'8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 449.
14Ibid.
The Growth of the Law, Honorable Benjamin N. Cardozo (p. 39).
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 140.
NOTES AND COMMENT
mutuality, as that expression is used by courts of equity, does not
imply that the contract before the court of chancery is invalid.3
Mutuality in actions for specific performance, to which the equit-
able rule has application "not only requires the existence of a valid
contract but 'mutuality' of remedy." The rule itself has so many
well-defined exceptions as to render it almost entirely inefficacious.4
Indeed, although the rule as to the necessity for mutuality in obtain-
ing a decree for specific performance of a contract has been rational-
ized by the courts of this State, the decisions rendered, however, may
not tend for greater clarity in a general consideration of the doctrine,
for, in effect, they multiply the exceptions thereto.5 Mutuality of
remedy, as a requisite of a contract sought to be specifically enforced,
is now important "only in so far as its presence is essential to the
attainment of that end." 6 Hence, even here, departure is found.
The true quest of the court of equity in such case is whether the
decree if rendered will operate without injustice or oppression either
to plaintiff or to defendant." 7 Consequently, the presence or absence
of mutuality is not the determining factor.
Returning to the purely legal aspects of the doctrine, it will be
found that mutuality of obligation may exist and the contract, never-
theless, will be without legal efficacy, and this apart from questions of
public policy. A promise by A in consideration of a promise by B
to perform something which the latter was already under a contrac-
tual duty to do for the former,, is unenforceable. Although mutual
promises are here present, such a contract is nevertheless invalid.
The same promise made by C, however, to A and B, in return for
their promise not to break their agreement with each other or, in
other words, to preserve their contract, is valid." The form of the
mutual promise, in either case, may be identical. The enforceability
thereof, it will be seen, is not dependent upon the fact that mutuality
of promise is present but upon the existence or non-existence of a
valid consideration. That the latter is the fundamental factor is
indicated by the very authorities recently decided purporting to
invoke the doctrine of mutuality.
In a leading case 9 decided by the Court of Appeals, it was said:
"The agreement was not under seal, and, therefore, fell
within the rule that a promise not under seal by one party,
with none by the other, is void. Unless both parties to a
'Ibid.
'Supra, note 2, Vol. 3, Sees. 1433-4.
'Address before City Bar Association by Andrews, J., printed on editorial
page, N. Y. L. J., June 25, 1927.
'Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 494, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
7 Epstein v. Gluckin, supra.
'DeCicco v. Scweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 436, 117 N. E. 807 (1917) ; Schwartz-
reich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N. Y. 196, 204, 131 N. E. 887 (1921);
McGovern v. City of N. Y., 234 N. Y. 377, 387, 138 N. E. 26 (1923).
'Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N. Y. 459, 461, 132 N. E.
148 (1921).
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contract are bound, so that either can sue the other for a
breach, neither is bound."
Plaintiff there declared on a contract consisting of a letter writ-
ten by a representative of the defendant company to the plaintiff
stating in substance that the defendant had entered plaintiff's contract
for requirements of glue for a designated year at a specified price,
deliveries to be made during the year as ordered. At the bottom of
that letter, plaintiff wrote "Accepted," affixing its signature. The
Court pointed out that plaintiff "did not agree to do or refrain from
doing anything. It was not obligated to sell a pound of defendant's
glue or to make any effort in that direction. It did not agree not to
sell other glue in competition with defendant's. The only obliga-
tion assumed by it was to pay 9c. a pound for such glue as it might
order. Whether it should' order any at all rested entirely on it. If
it did not order any glue, then nothing was to be paid." Under these
circumstances, it was held that the alleged contract was invalid "for
lack of mutuality."
More recently, the Appellate Division of the Fourth Depart-
ment, in deciding a similar case, quotes the following from Clark's
New York Law of Contracts: "Unless the contract is supported by
some other consideration, there must be as a general rule, mutuality
of obligation to render it binding on either party." 10 The facts
before the court were as follows: The plaintiff, a cigar manufacturer,
made an agreement with the defendants, who were jobbers, not to sell
cigars in certain territory without the defendants' consent, provided
the defendants purchased of him not less than an average of 10,000
cigars weekly. The parties continued to deal with each other on
this basis, the defendants at times purchasing in excess of the speci-
fied quantity, until the plaintiff wrote the defendants terminating the
agreement. The defendants thereafter demanded further deliveries
but the plaintiff refused to have any dealings with them. The plain-
tiff sued to recover the purchase price of a quantity of cigars and
the defendants counterclaimed for an alleged breach of the contract.
The Court held that the agreement was unenforceable for "lack of
mutuality."
In this type of case, where one party is afforded an option of
discontinuing or completely nullifying the agreement on his part and
of fixing the measure and extent of his own performance, privileges
which the other does not enjoy, Williston says much "confusion has
arisen." n The question before the court really is "whether one
party to the transaction can by fair implication be regarded as making
any 12 promise" and "this," the author very properly says, "is simply
an inquiry whether there is consideration for the other party's
promise." Is
l' Smith v. Diem, 223 App. Div. 572, 229 N. Y. S. 56 (4th Dept. 1928).
11 Supra, note 2.
Italics ours.
Supra, note 2.
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This is true in a series of interesting cases, in which it is said
"mutual promises are implied." One of the most recent of these
involves the charitable subscription, where it has been held that a
bilateral agreement may exist though one of the mutual promises be
a promise "implied in fact, an inference from conduct as opposed to
an inference from words." 14 Other examples of this type of case
are referred to and enumerated in Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Cooper's
Glue Factory.}' A leading case of recent years is the well-known
decision of the Court of Appeals in Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 16 "where
there was used the classical phrase 'instinct with an obligation'." In
referring to this authority, Judge Andrews of the Court of Appeals
of this State, in an address to which reference has heretofore been
made,17 said:
"In a certain contract an express promise by one party
may be lacking, yet when the agreement is viewed as a whole
it may be seen to be meaningless unless such a promise is
implied. The grant to him of certain rights requires the
assumption by him of correlative duties. The Courts will
interpret such contracts as business men would ordinarily
understand them, and they would understand the contract as
intended to have business efficacy."
Here too, there is simply a search for a consideration and its
existence is ascertained not by the attempted application of a naked
formula but rules and reasons grounded in a firmer and more basic
conception of human rights and conduct, and more consonant with a
progressive administration of justice. To conclude, mutuality, as an
equitable doctrine, has given way, as we have seen, to such rules of
reason 18; as a legal formula, it would seem that its existence is hardly
essential as a practical aid in weighing and judging contractual rights
and obligations.
R.L.
SAllegheny Col. v. Nat. Chautauqua Co. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 377, 159
N. E. 173 (1927).
231 N. Y. 459, 462, 132 N. E. 148 (1921). "Thus, where the purchaser,
to the knowledge of the seller, has entered into a contract for the resale of the
article purchased (Shipnan v. Straitsville Central Mining Co., 158 U. S. 356;
where the purchaser contracts for his requirements of an article necessary to
be used in the business carried on by him (Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N. Y. 642) ;
or for all the cans needed in a canning factory (Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co.,
128 Mich. 591) ; all the lubricating oil for party's own use (Manhattan Oil Co.
v. Richardson Lubricating Co., 113 Fed. Rep. 923; all the coal needed for a
foundry during a specified time (Minnesota Lumber Co. v. WhIitebreast Coal
Co. (160 Ill. 85); all the iron required during a certain period in a furnace
(National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427); and all the ice
required in a hotel during a certain season (G. N. Railway Co. v. Witham,
L. R., 9 C. P. 16)."
"222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
' Supra, note 5.
s Supra, note 7.
